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A discrete-time version of the replicator equation for two-strategy games is studied. The stationary
properties differ from those of continuous time for sufficiently large values of the parameters, where
periodic and chaotic behavior replace the usual fixed-point population solutions. We observe the
familiar period-doubling and chaotic-band-splitting attractor cascades of unimodal maps but in some
cases more elaborate variations appear due to bimodality. Also unphysical stationary solutions can
have unusual physical implications, such as the uncertainty of final population caused by sensitivity
to initial conditions and fractality of attractor preimage manifolds.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg, 05.45.Ac, 05.45.Gg
Evolutionary dynamics deals with a generic situation
in which individuals interact and reproduce according to
the result of that interaction, which in turn depends on
the composition of the population [1–3]. This feedback
loop gives rise to highly non trivial phenomena, that have
attracted the interest of the physics community from the
dynamical systems [4–7] , statistical mechanics [8–10] and
extended systems [11–14] viewpoints. A particularly im-
portant class of problems is encompassed by the family
generically referred to as replicator dynamics [15–17]. If
xi is the frequency of type i = 1, . . . , n, x ∈ R
n is the
frequency vector describing the population as a whole,
and the interaction is given by the n × n payoff matrix
A, then (Ax)i is the expected payoff for an individual of
type i and xTAx is the average payoff of the population.
Assuming that the per capita rate of growth is given by
the difference between the payoff for type i and the aver-
age payoff in the population, we arrive at the replicator
equation
x˙i = xi[(Ax)i − x
TAx]. (1)
Other forms have been proposed for this equation, which,
e.g., include a denominator given by the average global
payoff (albeit in this case the orbits of the resulting equa-
tion are the same) or other modifications (see, e.g., [3];
see also [18] and references therein). However, Eq. (1) is
the one most often studied, and therefore we will stick to
this form in the following.
Among the very many nonlinear phenomena exhibited
by the replicator equation, the appearance of chaotic dy-
namics has been studied in a number of papers. The
Poincare´-Bendixson theorem [19] establishes that chaos
can only arise in a continuous dynamical system (speci-
fied by differential equations) if it has three or more di-
mensions. Accordingly, Skyrms [20] showed that chaos
does not exist for three types (also referred to as strate-
gies) and gave examples of chaotic dynamics on strange
attractors with four strategies. Further examples were
provided in [21, 22]. Subsequently, Sato et al. [23] found
both hamiltonian and non-hamiltonian chaos in a three-
type version of the rock-scissors papers game [1, 16] by
introducing asymmetry (payoffs depend on being the first
or the second to interact).
In this letter we show that replicator dynamics does
lead to chaos in games with only two types when the
discretized version of the equation is considered, i.e.,
xi
t+1 = x
i
t
+ xi
t
[(Axt)i − (x
t)TAxt], (2)
where xt is the composition of the population at time t.
We will refer to Eq. (2) in what follows as the replicator
mapping and can be seen as arising from situations in
which changes per generation are not necessarily small
[16]. We note that this is one of several existing discrete
versions of the replicator equations [18] and in particular
it has been considered in [24, 25]. As we will see below,
the relevance of this result goes beyond the observation
of chaos in low-dimensional systems under the required
circumstances: Indeed, the occurrence of chaos as well as
of periodic trajectories gives rise to unexpected behavior
in well-known games for which so far only rest points
have been reported.
We will focus on the generic two-strategy game given
by the payoff matrix
C D
C 1 S
D T 0
(3)
where payoffs for the row player are indicated. This
choice encompasses several of the most important dilem-
mas arising in both biological and social applications.
According to the values of T and S, we have four basic
social dilemmas: When T > 1 and S > 0 (upper-right re-
gion in Fig. 1) we obtain the Snowdrift game (also known
as Chicken or Hawk-Dove) [26], which represents a sit-
uation in which the best thing is to do the opposite of
2FIG. 1: Upper panel: sign of the Lyapunov exponent (bright:
negative, i.e. periodic solutions; dark: positive, ı.e. chaotic
solutions). Lower panel: zoom of a zone of the first region.
what the opponent does (i.e., it is an anti-coordination
game). The region T < 1 and S < 0 (lower-left region)
corresponds to the Stag Hunt game [27], a coordination
game in which what is best is to do as the other player
does. Finally, the other two regions define the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (T > 1 and S < 0, lower-right) [28], where D
is the best option no matter what the opponent chooses,
and the Harmony game [29], with C being now the best
strategy. In general, practically all the studies published
on this two-parametric representation of social dilemmas
deal with the square T ∈ [0, 2], S ∈ [−1, 1] (referred to as
“basic square” in what follows) as this is deemed enough
to understand the four main classes of games, although
other special regions can be identified (see, e.g., [30]).
With these payoffs, the replicator mapping given by Eq.
(2) becomes
xt+1 = xt + xt(1 − xt)[S + (1− T − S)xt], (4)
where xt now stands for the proportion of C-strategists
in the population (the frequency of D-strategists being
obviously 1− xt).
To begin our analysis, we first consider the Lyapunov
exponent of the mapping in Eq. (4) as a function of T and
S, plotted in Figure 1. As can be seen from the figure,
below the diagonal the Lyapunov exponent is negative
almost everywhere, whereas above the diagonal there is
a region with intricate boundaries where the exponent
remains positive, and outside that region it becomes neg-
ative. Interestingly, the basic square is contained in the
region in which the Lyapunov exponent is negative. We
recall that a negative Lyapunov exponent is indicative of
periodic solutions and, as will be discussed below, peri-
ods P > 1 do exist, although always outside the basic
square, where only the well-known fixed-point solutions
(P = 1) are found. Perhaps this is the reason why all
this new phenomenology has not been noticed before,
and it indicates that capturing the richness of evolution-
ary game theory, when viewed in discrete time, demands
the study of a larger payoff parameter region or, alter-
natively, of certain specific cases. In fact, as the zoom
in Fig. 1 shows, the boundary between the chaotic and
non-chaotic regions is very complicated, with fractal fea-
tures, as it is regularly the case in dynamical systems.
Another important remark is that in relation to game
theory we have observed two types of chaos. There is
non-physical chaos when in the chaotic region the vari-
able xt becomes negative or takes values larger than 1,
which are unphysical in so far it is the frequency of C-
strategists and therefore must be bounded by 0 and 1;
this takes place in the upper-left region, the Harmony
game. On the other hand, in the Snowdrift game, we
have observed physical chaos in the sense that the values
of xt remain bounded within 0 and 1 for all times, and
therefore trajectories represent actually realizable evolu-
tions of populations. It is important to realize, however,
that even non-physical chaos can be relevant in the sense
that while trajectories become unphysical above 1 or be-
low 0, the existence of chaos makes unpredictable in prac-
tice where any initial condition will end, i.e., to which of
the two absorbing states xt = 0 or xt = 1 will become at-
tached. Moreover, in case the chaotic motion takes place
only around one of these two absorbing states, so that
we know exactly in which of them the system will freeze,
the time τ needed to reach the final configuration is sen-
sitively dependent on the initial conditions and therefore
unpredictable. These considerations hold in particular
when τ is large and the system stays in the physical in-
terval [0, 1] enough time before hitting a boundary: we
have verified that when the initial condition is close to
an unstable equilibrium (or repellor), this is actually the
case.
In order to gain more insight on how the transition to
chaos takes place, we have focused on the case T = S = A
and represented the Lyapunov exponent as a function of
the new parameter A. Figure 2 shows the behavior of
the Lyapunov exponent as a function of A. The upper
plot clearly shows that both in the region where we found
physical (A > 0) or unphysical (A < 0) behavior there is
a well defined route to chaos. Furthermore, the unphysi-
cal region reproduces the period-doubling route to chaos
characteristic of unimodal (one hump) maps, whereas in
the physical region we have a different but not unrelated
route that arises because of bimodality (two extrema) of
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FIG. 2: Upper panel: Behavior of the Lyapunov exponent
along the diagonal T = S, as a function of the parameter
A = T = S, no noise. The acronyms indicate the games found
in the different regions: SH, Stag Hunt; HG, Harmony Game;
BoS, Battle of Sexes [5, 20]. Lower panel: same graphics with
noise (σ = 0.005).
the map when A > 0. For small to moderate A > 0 tra-
jectories settle into periodic and chaotic attractors gen-
erated separately by each of the extrema of the map, but
for sufficiently large A trajectories spread and bounce
between both extrema and converge to new periodic and
chaotic attractors. This is the reason why in Fig. 2 the
Lyapunov exponent for large A > 0 differs from the fa-
miliar unimodal pattern shown when A < 0. The lower
panel of Fig. 2 shows the effect on the Lyapunov expo-
nent of additive noise in Eq. (4). As expected, we ob-
serve a gradual smearing out of the fine structure due to
the removal of periodic and chaotic-band attractors with
increasing noise amplitude σ. This amplitude fixes the
largest period and number of bands present, 2N (σ), giv-
ing rise to the so-called bifurcation gap [31]. Importantly,
the chaotic behavior is not restricted to the diagonal: As
shown in Fig. 3 the boundary between the fixed point
solution (the same as in the continuous time replicator
equation) and the period-two orbits takes a hyperbole-
like shape. Then, moving outwards in the T − S plane,
boundaries between period two and period four orbits
appear, and so on. It is important to note that the plane
region usually considered in these studies, namely the
basic square T ∈ [0, 2], S ∈ [−1, 1] (bottom left of, and
out of, Fig. 3) contains only fixed point solutions, i.e.,
in that region the continuous replicator equation and the
discretized version we are studying here lead to the same
dynamical behavior. Finally, Fig. 4 illustrates the dy-
namics typically found in the route to chaos along the
diagonal (T = S) of the region with physical behavior.
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FIG. 3: Boundaries between areas of solutions with different
periodicity. Proceeding away from the bottom-left corner,
dots indicate curves where the maximum Lyapunov exponent
vanishes and separate regions where the asymptotic state is a
fixed point, a period-two orbit, a period-four orbit, etc. The
basic square lies outside the bottom-left corner of the plot, in
the fixed point region.
As A is increased, we observe the convergence to the fixed
point, continuous-like solution, or to periodic solutions
until reaching chaos (bottom panel of Fig. 4). This route
to chaos appears an infinite number of times along the
family of attractors generated by unimodal maps within
periodic windows that interrupt sections of chaotic at-
tractors. In the opposite parameter direction, a route
out of chaos accompanies each period-doubling cascade
by a chaotic band splitting cascade [19]. Bimodal maps
with a minimum and a maximum (as in the case A > 0)
display interesting variations of these attractor cascades.
In summary, we have studied a discretized version of
the replicator dynamics and found that there are large
regions of the T − S parameter space of the typical so-
cial dilemmas for which considering discrete time leads
to behavior largely different from the continuous one. In-
deed, beyond the restricted region which has been ana-
lyzed before, we observe that as the parameters T and S
increase, periodic (P > 1) and chaotic dynamics occurs.
This is an important difference with respect to the contin-
uous time dynamics, for which only fixed point solutions
are found. We have also classified those novel behav-
iors as physical and unphysical, depending on whether
the values of the concentration of C-strategists remain
in [0, 1] or spread beyond the boundaries of this inter-
val. In the physical case, periodic solutions imply that
C and D strategists vary periodically in frequency, the
state of the system being generally mixed, containing
both types of individuals. Such cycles have only been
observed in the continuous replicator dynamics for rock-
scissors-paper games, i.e., games with three strategies
[1–3]. The occurrence of chaotic behavior adds unpre-
dictability to the features of the system, in complete
contrast with the predictive character of the continuous
case. On the other hand, periodic or chaotic behavior,
even being unphysical, still has important consequences:
In the time interval in which the trajectory is still con-
tained in [0, 1], in the chaotic region it turns out that it
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FIG. 4: Examples of time behavior for the map with T = S,
with xt being the cooperator density vs time. From to top to
bottom: periods one (fixed point) and two, period four, and
chaotic solution. Values of T and S indicated.
is not possible to predict whether, starting from a given
initial condition, the system will end up in a population
fully consisting of C- or D-strategists. We stress that
our results may be relevant for real life applications, in
many cases involving bacteria, animals or humans which
are well described by social dilemmas that do not have
well-determined payoffs, and often take place in discrete
time. In principle, it is possible to test our ideas in ex-
perimental setups, at least with human volunteers, by
setting properly chosen payoffs and interactions as dis-
crete events. Clearly, the appearance of periodic orbits
and chaos is generic and will affect other strategic inter-
actions when described by a discretized equation. Uni-
modal maps (obtained e.g., when A < 0) show a rich self-
affine structure of chaotic-band attractors interspersed by
periodic windows within which multiple period-doubling
and band-splitting cascades take place. Bimodal maps
(obtained e.g., when A > 0) display more elaborate at-
tractor structures. These dynamical features manifest in
the discrete-time evolutionary dynamics addressed here
and translate into matching patterns of population be-
havior.
D. V. aknowledges a postdoctoral contract from Uni-
versidad Carlos III de Madrid. The stay of A. R. at Uni-
versidad Carlos III de Madrid was supported by a grant
from the Ministerio de Educacio´n y Ciencia (Spain). A.
S. aknowledges grants MOSAICO and Complexity-NET
RESINEE (Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacio´n, Spain)
and MODELICO-CM (Comunidad de Madrid, Spain).
[1] M. A. Nowak, Evolutionary dynamics: exploring the
equations of life (The Belknap Press of Harvard Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, 2006).
[2] J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, Evolutionary Games
and Population Dynamics (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1998).
[3] J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, Bulletin of the American
Mathematical Society 40, 479 (2003).
[4] A. Traulsen, T. Ro¨hl, and H. G. Schuster, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 93, 28701 (2004).
[5] A. Traulsen, J. C. Claussen, and C. Hauert, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 95, 238701 (2005).
[6] C. P. Roca, J. A. Cuesta, and A. Sa´nchez, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 97, 158701 (2006).
[7] T. Galla, Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 198702 (2009).
[8] J. Berg and A. Engel, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 4999 (1998).
[9] G. Szabo´ and C. Hauert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 118101
(2002).
[10] L. M. Flor´ıa, C. Gracia-Lazaro, J. G. Garden˜es, and
Y. Moreno, Phys. Rev. E 79, 026106 (2009).
[11] G. Szabo´ and G. Fa´th, Phys. Rep. 446, 97 (2007).
[12] C. Castellano, S. Fortunato, and V. Loreto, Rev. Mod.
Phys. 81, 591 (2009).
[13] C. P. Roca, J. Cuesta, and A. Sa´nchez, Phys. Life Rev.
6, 208 (2009).
[14] M. Perc and A. Szolnoki, BioSystems 99, 109 (2010).
[15] P. D. Taylor and L. Jonker, Math. Biosci. 40, 145 (1978).
[16] J. Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982).
[17] P. Schuster and K. Sigmund, J. Theor. Biol. 100, 533
(1983).
[18] K. G. Binmore, L. Samuelson, and R. Vaughan, Games
Econ. Behav. 11, 1 (1995).
[19] H. Schuster, Deterministic Chaos. An Introduction, 2nd
revised ed. (VCH, Weinheim, 1988).
[20] B. Skyrms, J. Logic Lang. Infor. 1, 111 (1992).
[21] M. A. Nowak and K. Sigmund, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
USA 90, 5091 (1993).
[22] T. Chawanya, Prog. Theor. Phys. 94, 163 (1995).
[23] Y. Sato, E. Akiyama, and J. D. Farmer, Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. USA 99, 4748 (2002).
[24] E. Dekel and S. Scotchmer, J. Econ. Theory 57, 392
(1992).
[25] A. Cabrales and J. Sobel, J. Econ. Theory 57, 407 (1992).
[26] R. Sugden, The economics of rights, co-operation and
welfare (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986).
[27] B. Skyrms, The Stag Hunt and Evolution of Social Struc-
ture (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003).
[28] R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books,
New York, 1984).
[29] A. N. Licht, Yale J. Int. Law 24, 61 (1999).
[30] C. Hauert, Int. J. Bif. Chaos 12, 1531 (2002).
[31] J. P. Crutchfield, J. Farmer, and B. A. Huberman,
Physics Reports 92, 45 (1982).
